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Device-independent quantum key distribution aims at providing security guarantees even when
using largely uncharacterised devices. In the simplest scenario, these guarantees are derived from
the CHSH score, which is a simple linear combination of four correlation functions. We here derive
a security proof from a generalisation of the CHSH score, which effectively takes into account the
individual values of two correlation functions. We show that this additional information, which is
anyway available in practice, allows one to get higher key rates than with the CHSH score. We
discuss the potential advantage of this technique for realistic photonic implementations of device-
independent quantum key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to give
two parties — Alice & Bob — the possibility to generate
a secret key when they share a quantum channel. For
instance, in the implementation proposed by Ekert [1],
the channel consists of a source producing entangled
particles that are distributed to Alice & Bob. At each
round, each of Alice & Bob measure one particle by
choosing one out of several measurement settings. The
claim that Alice’s measurement results are secure, i.e.
unknown to any third party – Eve – who may control
the quantum channel, is guaranteed by inferring (from
Alice and Bob’s measurement results) that the source
emits states close to pure bipartite entangled states.
This ensures at the same time that Bob’s results are
correlated to Alice’s ones if he chooses an appropriate
measurement setting, i.e. Alice and Bob’s measurement
results can form a secret key.
Ekert suggested that the information about the key
that may be available to an adversary can be quanti-
fied by choosing settings allowing Alice & Bob to vi-
olate a Bell inequality. This idea was later progres-
sively formalised and led to what is now called device-
independent QKD (DIQKD). In its simplest version,
DIQKD is implemented by letting Alice choose randomly
between two measurement settings at each round, Ax
where x ∈ {0, 1}, while Bob’s measurement includes
three possible settings, By where y ∈ {0, 1, 2}. For set-
tings x, y ∈ {0, 1}, the results – which can possibly take
many values – are post-processed locally and turned into
binary values Ax,By ∈ {−1,+1}. After several itera-
tions, Alice and Bob communicate classically to estimate
the CHSH score
S = 〈A0 ⊗ (B0 +B1) +A1 ⊗ (B0 −B1)〉 (1)
where 〈Ax ⊗ By〉 = p(Ax = By|x, y) − p(Ax 6= By|x, y)
quantifies the correlation between the outcomes for mea-
surement choices x and y, respectively. The remaining
measurement setting y = 2 is chosen to generate an
outcome B2 that minimises the uncertainty with respect
to A0. Alice then forms the raw key from the outcomes
A0 of the pairs that Bob measured with respect to y = 2.
We consider n such rounds, over which the source
produces a tripartite state |ΨABE〉 shared between Alice,
Bob and Eve. Ref. [2] showed that Eve’s information
is the same as in the case where the devices have
no memory and behave identically and independently
in each communication round of the protocol, up to
corrections vanishing with n. In particular, we can
write |ΨABE〉 = |ψ〉⊗nABE where |ψ〉ABE is the tripar-
tite state of a single round and consider the case where
measurements are done successively on the state |ψ〉ABE .
In the asymptotic limit of large n, the number of secret
bits per round obtained after one-way error correction
and privacy amplification (i.e. the key rate) is then given
by [3]
r = H(A0|E)−H(A0|B2), (2)
where H is the von Neumann entropy. Ref. [4] showed
that the conditional entropy H(A0|E) optimized over all
states ψABE and measurements Ax, By compatible with
the observed CHSH score S is lower bounded by
H(A0|E) ≥ 1− h
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
(3)
where h denotes the binary entropy. This provides
a lower bound on the key rate, as the conditional
entropy H(A0|B2) can be estimated directly from Alice
and Bob measurement results associated to setting
choices A0 and B2. Interestingly, this bound is obtained
device-independently, i.e. without assumptions on the
dimension of quantum states and the calibration of mea-
surements. This is not the case for standard (non-device
independent) QKD protocols which are not based on
the violation of a Bell inequality and whose security
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2guarantees rely on the assumption that the source
and measurements carry out precisely the operations
foreseen by the protocol. This assumption is hard to
meet in practice and leads to vulnerabilities, as demon-
strated by hacking experiments [5–8]. The robustness
of device-independent quantum key distribution against
these attacks makes it appealing, and a race between
several experimental groups is ongoing to report the
first proof-of-principle distribution of a key with a fully
device-independent security. Measurement-DIQKD, a
precursor of DIQKD where device-independence only
applies to the measurement devices, but not to those
used for state preparation [9, 10], already admit a
number of experimental implementations [11–15].
Let us note that the proof leading to the bound
given in Eq. (3) only uses the knowledge of the CHSH
score. This score is computed as a linear combi-
nation of the correlation functions 〈AxBy〉, but the
additional information provided by considering these
correlations individually – which is anyway available
in practice – might help to facilitate a realisation of
device-independent quantum key distribution. This
motivation is at the core of this work.
Concretely, we consider the individual values of two
terms appearing in the CHSH score, namely
X = 〈A0 ⊗ (B0 +B1)〉,
Y = 〈A1 ⊗ (B0 −B1)〉. (4)
The use of values of X and Y proved to be useful for
device-independent state certification by improving the
certified fidelity from the CHSH score [16]. It is also
expected to be useful in DIQKD, as the knowledge of
X and Y allows one to differentiate the contributions of
the key generating measurement A0 from the ones as-
sociated with A1, from which no key is generally ex-
tracted (see [17] for a noticeable exception). Finally, in
implementations of DIQKD with non-unit detection effi-
ciencies where no-detection events are attributed a fixed
value ±1, no-detections on Bob’s side can only contribute
to one of these two correlation functions (X or Y). The
main result of this work is to confirm the intuition that
the use of individual values of X and Y improves the
bounds on Eve’s information derived from the CHSH
score, and hence the key rate of DIQKD.
II. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
a. Generalization of the CHSH test– We are inter-
ested in bounding Eve’s conditional entropy H(A0|E) ap-
pearing in Eq. (2) as a direct function of observed quan-
tities X and Y. Formally, this can be accomplished by
considering all possible quantum models (ψABE , Ay, By)
that satisfy Xmodel ≥ X and Ymodel ≥ Y. However, it is
clear that the set of points (X,Y) for which Eve’s condi-
tional entropy is bounded from below by some constant is
convex: two quantum models giving some amount of in-
formation to Eve can be joined into a new model on which
Eve’s conditional entropy is bounded by the weighted
sum of entropy bounds associated to the individual mod-
els. It is thus equivalent to bound Eve’s conditional en-
tropy with linear constraints of the form
cos(Ω)
2
Xmodel +
sin(Ω)
2
Ymodel ≥ β, (5)
where β is deduced from the observed quantities X and
Y from the following formula
β =
1
2
(cos (Ω) X + sin (Ω) Y) . (6)
(Further in the text, we will use a compact notation for
sine SΩ = sin(Ω) and cosine CΩ = cos(Ω).) Obviously,
Ω = pi/4 reduces back to the CHSH constraint (up
to normalization). Just like the CHSH score can be
seen as the result of a test of the CHSH inequality,
we can associate β to the test of a Bell inequality –
a generalisation of the CHSH inequality – that we
characterize below, see Eq. (15).
b. Reduction to qubits– The score β given in Eq. (6)
is estimated when Alice and Bob choose the measurement
Ax, By, x, y = 0, 1, which are observables with eigenval-
ues ±1. A simple lemma – the Jordan lemma [18] – tells
us that such observables can be jointly block diagonalised
with blocks of size 2× 2, i.e.
Ax =
⊕
k
Ax,k By =
⊕
k′
By,k′ , (7)
where, without loss of generality, we can assume the re-
striction to each qubit block to be a real Pauli operator
satisfying A2x,k = 1k and B
2
y,k′ = 1k′ . This means that
in each block labelled by k and k′ respectively, the mea-
surement is characterized by unit vectors akx, b
k′
y such
that
Ax,k = a
k
x ·
(
σz
σx
)
By,k′ = b
k′
y ·
(
σz
σx
)
(8)
where σz and σx are Pauli operators.
The state |ψ〉ABE can be enforced to take the form
|ψ〉ABE =
⊕
k,k′
√
p(k,k′) |ψ〉(k,k
′)
ABE , (9)
where p(k,k′) is a probability distribution and |Ψ〉(k,k
′)
ABE ∈
C2A ⊗ C2B ⊗ H(4)E , see Refs [19, 20] for detailed discus-
sions. Given models with such measurements and state,
the quantity of interest can be expressed as
H(A0|E) =
∑
k,k′
p(k,k′)H(k,k′)(A0|E) (10)
where H(k,k′)(A0|E) is Eve’s conditional entropy for
four-qubit models (including the two qubits from Eve’s
3purification) involving real Pauli measurements. If the
minimization of H(k′,k)(A0|E) over such models satisfy-
ing cos(Ω)2 Xmodel,k,k′ +
sin(Ω)
2 Ymodel,k,k′ ≥ β provides a
convex function of β, this function can be used directly
as a lower bound on the quantity H(A0|E) through
Eq. (10). If it is not convex, it can be convexified so as to
apply to all possible mixtures of state and measurement,
and thus again apply to Eq. (10). This convexity
property allows us to reduce the general problem of
finding the minimum of Eve’s conditional entropy over
all possible models to a minimization over four-qubit
models with real Pauli measurements. We will come
back to this convexification requirement later.
c. Noisy preprocessing– We consider a simple post-
processing of the raw key, known as noisy pre-
processing [21–23], which has been shown to be beneficial
to reduce the requirement on the detection efficiency in
photonic implementations of device-independent quan-
tum key distribution [20]. Once the raw key is obtained,
Alice is instructed to generate a new raw key Â0 by flip-
ping each bit of the initial raw key with a probability p.
Such a pre-processing can be accounted by the model of
the key generating measurement, by considering a new
operator
Â0 = (1− p)A0 − pA0 (11)
which is not a Pauli operator anymore. Note that we
will often parametrise the amount of noise that Alice
adds with a parameter q = (1− 2p)2.
d. Symmetrization– In order to simplify the analy-
sis, it is convenient to consider a symmetrization step in
which both parties, Alice and Bob, flip the outcomes of
the key generating measurements depending on a public
random bit string. This guarantees that bits of the raw
key are random, i.e. H(A0) = H(Â0) = 1. Importantly,
one can show the equivalence of protocols with and with-
out symmetrization, meaning that the symmetrization
does not need to be implemented in practice, see [20] for
a complete description of the symmetrization step in the
presence of noisy preprocessing.
e. Reduction to Bell diagonal states– If the con-
straints appearing in the minimization problem do not
depend on the marginal probabilities p(Ax|x) and p(By|y)
of Alice and Bob respectively, the symmetrization step
previously presented reduces the model of the state to a
Bell-diagonal structure
|ψ〉ABE =
4∑
i=1
√
Li
∣∣Φi〉
AB
|i〉E (12)
where |Φi〉 = {Φ+,Ψ−,Φ−,Ψ+}4i=1, and without loss
of generality, a partial ordering of the eigenvalues
L1 ≥ L2 and L3 ≥ L4 can be imposed [19]. Note
that the superscripts k, k′ are omitted in the tripartite
state appearing in Eq. (12), i.e. |ψ〉ABE → |ψ〉(k,k
′)
ABE .
Until the end of this section and in the next section
which is dedicated to the resolution of the optimization
presented in Eq. (19), we remove the index k, k′ for
making the notation simpler and ask the reader to keep
in mind that we consider the restriction to four qubit
models with real Pauli measurements in this two sections.
f. Eve’s conditional entropy– Eve’s conditional en-
tropy can be expressed as
H(Â0|E) = H(Â0)−H(ρE) +
∑
aˆ=±1
p(aˆ)H(ρE|aˆ) (13)
where ρE is the reduced state of Eve and ρˆE|aˆ corre-
sponds to Eve’s state conditioned on Alice’s noisy key bit
Â0 being equal to aˆ, which occurs with probability p(aˆ).
The equivalence of the protocol with the symmetrized
one allows us to take H(Â0) = 1 and p(aˆ) =
1
2 .
H(ρE) is given by the entropy H(L) of the probability
vector L = (L1, . . . , L4) while the term ρ
(α,β)
E|aˆ=+1 equals L1 0 Cφ
√
L1L3q Sφ
√
L1L4q
0 L2 Sφ
√
L2L3q −Cφ
√
L2L4q
Cφ
√
L1L3q Sφ
√
L2L3q L3 0
Sφ
√
L1L4q −Cφ
√
L2L4q 0 L4

(14)
where φ labels Alice measurement A0 = cos(φ)σz +
sin(φ)σx (we use the notation Cφ = cos(φ) and
Sφ = sin(φ)). The two states ρE|aˆ=±1 are related by a
simple unitary transformation and therefore have the
same entropy, see App.A 2 for details. The expressions
of these entropic quantities provide an explicit way
to compute H(Â0|E) as a function of the parameters
L and φ. Let us now turn our attention to the constraints.
g. Quantum correlations in the (X,Y) plane – As
mentioned earlier, we are considering quantum models
with the values of correlators X and Y given by Eq. (4).
Without loss of generality, we can assume X,Y ≥ 0,
which can always be attained by relabeling the measure-
ment outcomes of A1, B0 and B1 (i.e. without touching
the angle φ).
In this positive quadrant of the plane, the local strate-
gies are delimited by the CHSH inequality X+Y ≤ 2, i.e.
the line connecting the deterministic strategies (X,Y) =
(2, 0) and (X,Y) = (0, 2). This implies the following local
bounds for the generalized CHSH tests
1
2
CΩX +
1
2
SΩY ≤ BLΩ = max(CΩ,SΩ). (15)
To identify the upper limit of the quantum set, we
consider the expected values of the generalized CHSH
operator
BΩ =
〈
CΩ
2
A0 ⊗ (B0 +B1) + SΩ
2
A1 ⊗ (B0 −B1)
〉
.
(16)
4To find its maximum value, we use the qubit parametriza-
tion of measurements Ay, By and parametrize the mea-
surement angles on Bob’s side as
B0 +B1 = (b0 + b1) ·
(
σz
σx
)
= 2Cθ c ·
(
σz
σx
)
B0 −B1 = (b0 − b1) ·
(
σz
σx
)
= 2Sθ c⊥ ·
(
σz
σx
) (17)
with two arbitrary perpendicular unit vectors c and c⊥,
and cos(2θ) = b0 · b1. From the diagonalization of the
operator on the right hand side of Eq. (16), one finds the
quantum bound
BQΩ = 1 (18)
attained at (X,Y) = (2 cos(Ω), 2 sin(Ω)) by a maximally
entangled two qubit state and measurement settings
a0 · a1 = 0 and b0 · b1 = cos(2Ω). It follows that Eve’s
information is constrained by the part of the quantum
set lying between the line X + Y = 2 and the circle
X2 + Y2 = 4. At this point, we can already conclude
that any quantum model with (X,Y) lying on the circle
satisfies H(Aˆ0|E) = 1 (except for the two points with
X+Y= 2), since the underlying state of Alice and Bob
has to be pure. This is a straightforward improvement
over the CHSH bound.
h. Formulation of the problem to solve– The reduc-
tions introduced so far invite us to first solve the following
optimization
I(β; Ω, q) = max
L,φ,a1,b0,b1
H(L)−H(ρE|aˆ=+1)
s.t. BΩ(L, φ,a1,b0,b1) ≥ β
(19)
and then consider directly the solution I(β; Ω, q) if
it is concave in βΩ or construct a concave function
Î(β; Ω, q) ≥ I(βΩ, q) to bound Eve’s uncertainty using
H(Â0|E) ≥ 1−min
Ω
Î
(
CΩX + SΩY
2
; Ω, q
)
. (20)
Note that from the symmetries of the goal function
H(L) − H(ρE|aˆ=+1) and the constraint BΩ, we can as-
sume φ ∈ [0, pi4 ] for the key generating setting and
L1 − L2 ≥ L3 − L4 in addition to L1 ≥ L2 and L3 ≥ L4
for the state, see App.A 1 for the details. Further note
that we will often use a parametrisation of the tripartite
state given by the following 3 component vector TzTx
Tp
 =
 L1 − L2 + L3 − L4L1 − L2 − L3 + L4
L1 + L2 − L3 − L4
 , (21)
with 0 ≤ Tx ≤ Tz ≤ 1 and Tz+Tx−1 ≤ Tp ≤ 1−(Tz−Tx).
III. BOUNDING EVE’S INFORMATION WITH
GENERALIZED CHSH TESTS
We are now ready to compute a bound on Eve’s infor-
mation as a function of the generalized CHSH score given
in Eq. (6) by solving the optimisation problem given in
Eq. (19). Among the parameters of the model in Eq. (19),
the measurement setting a1,b0 and b1 only influence the
constraint but not the goal function. Furthermore, it is
shown in Ref. [20] that H(ρE|aˆ=+1) is a monotonic func-
tion in the key generating setting φ ∈ [0, pi4 ]. We can thus
decompose the maximization problem in two steps. First,
for a fixed state L, we find the lowest angle φ allowing to
satisfy the constraint
φ∗(L, β,Ω) = minφ
s.t. max
a1,b0,b1
BΩ(L, φ,a1,b0,b1) ≥ β. (22)
Second, we fix φ = φ∗(L, β,Ω) to the optimal value for
Eve, and maximize her information with respect to the
state, that is, we solve
I(β; Ω, q) = max
L
H(L)−H(ρE|aˆ=+1;φ∗(L, β,Ω)). (23)
We solve Eq. (22) in App. A 3. The expression of the
optimal angle φ∗ depends on whether the parameter Ω
exceeds pi4 . We treat the two cases Ω ≤ pi4 and Ω > pi4
separately.
A. The simple case with Ω ≤ pi
4
For the Bell tests satisfying Ω ≤ pi4 , which include the
CHSH test, the observed score β does not constrain the
key generating setting φ but only the state L. As a result,
there always exists a realization with the optimal angle
φ∗ = 0 as long as the state is such that the Bell score can
be attained, i.e. if
C2ΩT
2
z + S
2
ΩT
2
x ≥ β2Ω. (24)
The maximization of the entropy then becomes possi-
ble, as for φ = 0 the conditional state ρE|aˆ=+1 is block
diagonal and its entropy has a simple closed-form expres-
sion. Such a maximization has been done for the CHSH
case (Ω = pi4 ) in Ref. [20], but Ref. [24] pointed out that
the analytical bounds on conditional entropies given in
this reference assumes qubit attacks. The same bounds
were derived using a different approach in [24], where it is
also proved that these bounds are convex. The convexity
results of [24], together with Jordan’s lemma, imply that
the obtained qubit bounds are in fact valid for any dimen-
sions. The same convexity proof applies to the current
situation with Ω ≤ pi/4. For the sake of completeness,
we provide in App. A 5 an alternative proof of convexity,
which directly applies to the present case and to [20]. We
show in particular (see App. A 4)
I(β; Ω, q) = hq(z) = h(z)− h(nq(z))
with nq(z) =
1 +
√
1− 4 (1− q) z(1− z)
2
and z =
1
2

√
β2 − C2Ω
SΩ
+ 1
 ,
(25)
5where h is the binary entropy. The concavity of I(β; Ω, q)
and hence the convexity of Eve’s entropyH(Â0|E) follows
from (see App. A 5)
d2
dβ2
hq
(
z(β)
)
= h′′q (z)
(
z′(β)
)2
+ h′q(z)z
′′(β) ≤ 0. (26)
Finally, it remains to determine the optimal inequality
to use for a given point (X,Y). hq(z) being a monotonic
function of z, we derive the expression
z =
1
2

√
(CΩX+SΩY2 )
2 − C2Ω
SΩ
+ 1
 , (27)
with respect to Ω to find its local maximum and verify
that this value satisfies Ω ≤ pi4 . We find that for
4−X2
XY
< 1 : zopt =
1
2
(
Y√
4−X2 + 1
)
(28)
associated to the generalized CHSH test with
tan(Ω) =
4−X2
XY
. (29)
For
4−X2
XY
≥ 1 : zopt = 1
2
1 +
√(
X + Y
2
)2
− 1
 ,
(30)
which is the formula for the CHSH case Ω = pi4 [20].
B. The complicated case with Ω > pi
4
1. Bounding Eve’s information from a numerical
optimization
For the remaining Bell tests, with Ω > pi4 , the situation
is different. Here, the generalized CHSH score β does not
only constraint the state L but also the setting of the
key generating measurement. In particular, we find that
there are two different regions.
First, for the states falling in the range
S(β,Ω) = {L|(C2ΩT 2z + S2ΩT 2x ) ≤ β2 ≤ (C2ΩT 2x + S2ΩT 2z )},
(31)
the constraint BΩ ≥ β can be satisfied with the measure-
ment angle φ ≥ φ∗(L,Ω, β), where cos2(φ∗) = c2∗(L,Ω, β)
is given by
c2∗(L,Ω, β) =
(β2 − S2ΩT 2x )(C2ΩT 2x + S2ΩT 2z − β2)
C2Ω(T
2
z − T 2x )(S2ΩT 2z + S2ΩT 2x − β2)
. (32)
The constraint on the angle only becomes trivial, c2∗ = 1,
on the boundary of the region S, where (C2ΩT
2
z +S
2
ΩT
2
x ) =
β2.
Second, in the region where (C2ΩT
2
z + S
2
ΩT
2
x ) > β
2 the
Bell score β can also be attained with φ = 0. However,
there models provide less information to Eve as compared
to these on the boundary (C2ΩT
2
z + S
2
ΩT
2
x ) = β
2, see the
discussion at the end of App. A 4. So we can safely ignore
this region.
To find the best strategy for Eve, it thus remains to
solve
I(β; Ω, q) = max
L∈S(Ω,β)
H(L)−H(E|aˆ = +1; c2∗(L,Ω, β)).
(33)
This optimization only involves an analytic function
of three parameters on a compact domain. It can be
easily and time-efficiently solved by standard numerical
methods. We now give an ansatz on the solution of
the optimization given in Eq. (33), which allows one to
speed up its numerical resolution even further.
2. Ansatz
First, we observe that the vector L saturating Eve’s
information only has two non-zero coefficients L1 = 1 −
L3 and L2 = L4 = 0, or Tz = 1 and Tx = Tp. With this
observation, the previous optimization problem becomes
a scalar optimization, that is
I˜anz(β; Ω, q) = max
β2−S2
Ω
C2
Ω
≤T 2x≤
β2−C2
Ω
S2
Ω
h
(
1 + Tx
2
)
− h
(
1 +
√
T 2x + c
2∗q(1− T 2x )
2
)
.
(34)
Second, we see that the bound I˜anz(β; Ω, q) is not con-
cave for small β. However, we observe that its concave
roof can be obtained by drawing a line which passes
through the point
β = BLΩ = sin(Ω)
IL(q) = I(BLΩ; Ω, q) = 1− h
(
1 +
√
q
2
)
(35)
which is tangent to the curve I˜anz(β; Ω, q). The value of
the generalized CHSH score at the tangent point can be
found by solving
β∗ = argminβ
IL(q)− I˜anz(β; Ω, q)
β − sin(Ω) . (36)
Labeling I∗(Ω, q) = I˜anz(β∗; Ω, q), this leads to
Îanz(β; Ω, q) =
{
I∗(Ω,q)(β−sin(Ω))−IL(q)(β−β∗)
β∗−sin(Ω) β < β∗
I˜anz(β; Ω, q) β ≥ β∗
(37)
At this stage, we further observe that the optimal value
of T 2x for values of β ≥ β∗ coincides with its maximum
6possible value T 2x =
β2−C2Ω
S2Ω
, which defines Ianz(β; Ω, q).
In the Eqs. (36) and (37) we can now replace I˜anz(β; Ω, q)
with Ianz(β; Ω, q), which does not involve any nolinear
optimization.
While we believe this expression to be the true bound,
we do not have a formal proof. Anyway, this conjectured
expression helps to solve the optimization of interest.
3. Certified numerical solution
As mentionned before, the optimization in Eq. (33)
can be easily solved by standard numerical methods.
However, to provide a strict security guarantee to an
actual implementation of DIQKD, such a numerical
optimization would need to be done in a certified
manner, with a formal proof that the obtained numbers
lower bound Eve’s conditional entropy on the whole
domain. Below we present an algorithm which allows
one to do such a certified optimisation based on the
Lipshitz continuity of the goal function. The algorithm
is rather time-costly, but it only has to be used once the
optimal experimental parameters are fixed through an
ad hoc maximization of Eq. (33), cf. below.
Concretely, we present in this section an algorithm that
approximates the set of possible strategies of Eve, delim-
ited by the bound Î(β,Ω, q), from the outside. To avoid
the issue of concavity posed by Eq. (19), we rewrite the
problem in the dual form in which we look for the tangent
lines
f(t; Ω, q) = max
L,φ
H(ρE)−H(ρE |Aˆ0) + t βmax(L,φ; Ω)
βmax(L, φ; Ω) = max
a1,b0,b1
BΩ(L, φ,a1,b0,b1),
(38)
to the curve Î(β,Ω, q) with different slopes t. In Eq. (38)
we used the fact that it is only the Bell score that
depends on the measurement setting a1,b0,b1, so it can
be maximized straightforwardly to define βmax(L, φ; Ω),
see App. A 6 for its closed form expression.
Before giving the details on the way we solve this dual
form, let us shortly discuss on how it shall be used. We
consider an actual implementation of DIQKD with fixed
values of X∗,Y∗ and q∗ and for which there is an optimal
value Ω∗ which saturates the minimum in Eq. (20)
H(Aˆ0|E) ≥ 1− Î(β∗; Ω∗, q∗), (39)
with β∗ = 12 (CΩ∗X∗+ SΩ∗Y∗). Therefore, an optimal se-
curity guarantee for this particular implementation only
requires the knowledge of the function Î(β∗,Ω∗, q∗) on a
single point. The same lower bond on Eve’s conditional
entropy can be obtained from the value of the dual bound
f(t; Ω∗, q∗) in Eq. (38) on a single point. Indeed, the con-
cavity of Î(β; Ω, q) ensures that there exists a value t∗ for
which the inequality
f(t∗; Ω∗, q∗) ≥ Î(β; Ω∗, q∗) + t∗β (40)
is saturated at β = β∗ where f(t∗; Ω∗, q∗) = Î(β; Ω∗, q∗)+
t∗β∗. Using Eq. (38), we deduce that
H(Aˆ0|E) ≥ 1− f(t∗; Ω∗, q∗) + t∗β∗
= 1− Î(β∗; Ω∗, q∗).
(41)
Hence, for a fixed experimental implementation of the
protocol, it is sufficient to certify a single value of the
function f(t∗; Ω∗, q∗) in order to provide a strict and
optimal security guarantee. Furthermore, the value t∗ is
straightforward to find from the knowledge of Ω∗, β∗, q∗
and the function Î(β; Ω, q).
We can now comment on the algorithm to provably
upper bound the quantity in Eq. (38). While the
algorithm used recently for the derivation of key rates in
Ref. [25] could be easily adjusted to solve this problem,
we propose a branch and bound approach. Concretely,
we first derive a parametrization of the set (L, φ) for
which the goal function in Eq. (38) is Lipshitz continuous
with a constant that we compute. Then, we obtain
an upper bound on its value on the whole domain
by computing the value of the function on a grid of
points. Finally, the algorithm subsequently refines the
grid around the points where the value of the function
is large in order to approach, step by step, the global
maximum. Additional details are given in the next three
sections.
a. Lipshitz continuity of the entropy with respect to
the angle – A key ingredient in the implementation of
the desired certified algorithm is that the von Neumann
entropy H(ρ) has a bounded gradient with respect to
the following angle between the two states ρ and σ (see
App. B 1)
A(ρ, σ) = arccos(F (ρ, σ)), (42)
where the fidelity is defined as F (ρ, σ) = tr|√ρ√σ|. This
angle is a metric on the set of states [26]. More precisely,
we show that for n-dimensional quantum states, the gra-
dient of the entropy satisfies∣∣∣∣dHdA
∣∣∣∣ <
{
4.023 n = 4
2 log(n) n ≥ 5. (43)
This contrasts with the trace distance, another metric
on the set of quantum states, for which the entropy has
an infinite slope around non-full-rank states.
b. Bounding the gradient of the goal function– To
apply the continuity bound above to the goal function
in Eq. (38), we use the following parametrization of the
7state
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L =
 cos(α) cos(µ)cos(α) sin(µ)sin(α) cos(ξ)
sin(α) sin(ξ)
 , (44)
so that the quantum models are described by four angles
x = (α, µ, ξ, φ), (45)
with x ∈ [0, pi4 ]×3 × [0, pi2 ]. Here, the condition µ, ξ ≤ pi4
follow from L1 ≥ L2, L3 ≥ L4. The bound α ≤ pi4 is a
consequence of L1 +L2 ≥ L3 +L4, which can be imposed
on the states as an alternative to L1−L2 ≥ L3−L4, see
App. A 1.
To obtain a bound on the gradient of the goal function
G(x) = H(L)−H(ρE |aˆ = +1) + t βmax(L,φ; Ω) (46)
we bound the gradient of each term independently, as de-
scribed in App. B 2 and B 3. For the entropic terms, we
use Eq. (43), while the computation of the maximal gra-
dient is quite straightforward for the CHSH score. Com-
bining the three terms, we obtain a general bound
|∇xG| ≤ 12.7 + 7 t (47)
on the whole domain of x.
With this global bound on the gradient, a certified
maximization of the function G(x) can be obtained with
a slight modification of the code that we developed in
Ref. [27], which is available on GitHub. A detailed
description of this code can be found in the App. B 4.
IV. RESULTS
a. Improved bound on Eve’s conditional entropy–
In order to demonstrate the advantage of considering the
pair of variables (X,Y) when bounding Eve’s conditional
entropy, we compute the bound on H(Â0|E) for different
values of X, Y and p and compare it to the bound
obtained from the CHSH score [20]. Because of the two
regimes identified earlier, we compute both the optimal
bound assuming Ω ≤ pi/4 and the one assuming Ω > pi/4
for each value of X and Y, and keep the best one. In the
case Ω ≤ pi/4, the optimal choice of Ω is readily given
by Eq. (29). In the other case, we optimize the bound
over Ω ∈ (pi/4, pi/2]. The difference between this optimal
bound on H(Â0|E) given X and Y and Eq. (3) is shown
in Fig. 1. It shows that our bound on H(Â0|E) is better
than the one derived from the CHSH score, except along
the line satisfying X(X + Y) = 4.
FIG. 1. Difference between the bound on Eve’s conditional
entropy H(Â0|E) computed as a function of X and Y, and as a
function of the CHSH quantity S = 2
√
2(X+Y), for p = 0. In
presence of noisification (i.e. p > 0), the advantage follows a
similar distribution, but is smaller in magnitude. The CHSH
bound is only optimal along the curve X(X+Y) = 4. The ad-
vantage on the right-hand side of this curve is obtained with
Ω < pi/4, and on the left-hand side with Ω > pi/4. The yellow
(red) curve shows the trajectory in the X-Y plane which opti-
mizes the key rate in an optical implementation of DIQKD for
low (high) detection efficiencies. At the efficiency η = 0.923,
it is better to switch from one curve to the other one (at the
transition between full and dashed curves).
b. Implication for a practical realization of DIQKD–
We now study the potential impact of our bound on
practical realizations of DIQKD. In the limit of asymp-
totically many repetitions, an implementation is uniquely
characterized by its key rate r, which is given in Eq. (2).
In our case, this key rate is determined from three quan-
tities: X, Y and Bob’s uncertainty about Alice’s key gen-
erating bit as a function of the noisification parameter,
given by H(Â0|B2). Hence, in order to find the optimal
design for an experimental implementation of DIQKD,
we express the quantities
setup ' (X,Y, H(Aˆ0|B2)) (48)
as a function of the model’s parameters. Then, we max-
imize the key rate over these parameters:
rˇ = max
setup,Ω,q
H(Â0|E)−H(Â0|B2)
= max
setup,Ω,q
1− Î
(
CΩX + SΩY
2
; Ω, q
)
−H(Aˆ0|B2)
(49)
Solving this maximization gives a bound on the key rate
rˇ, the values
(
X∗,Y∗, H(Â0|B2)
)
expected for a given
8implementation, as well as the optimal values of the
parameters Ω∗ and q∗ for this implementation.
c. SPDC-based implementation of DIQKD– Pho-
tonic experiments using a source based on spontaneous
parametric down conversion (SPDC) are one of the most
promising setups for implementing DIQKD, as shown by
recent experiments reporting on the violation of a Bell
inequality without the fair sampling assumption [28–33].
We consider such a setup in which an SPDC source is
used to create and distribute polarization entanglement
between distant parties who perform measurements as
requested here in the proposed protocol. The main limi-
tation in this setup is the overall detection efficiency, i.e.
the possibility of losing a photon at any point between its
creation at the source and its final detection. To reflect
photon losses and non-unit detection efficiency, the
transmission channel between the source and the parties
is modeled as a lossy channel with an overall transmis-
sion η. It is also important to include the statistics of an
SPDC source which does not produce a two-qubit state,
but a state that contains vacuum and multiple photon
components. We invite the reader to look at Ref. [20] to
get explicit expressions of the exact statistics created by
this source as well as a description of tunable parameters.
When computing the key rate for an SPDC source
with a security determined by the CHSH score, any
values of X and Y with the same sum impose the same
bound on Eve’s conditional entropy H(Â0|E). In a
Eberhard-like scenario where a significant fraction of
the entangled particles can be lost before yielding their
measurement result, it is advantageous for Alice to use
two measurement settings with different overlap with
her Schmidt basis in order to maximize the CHSH
quantity [34]. It is then easier for Bob to guess the
outcome of one of the two measurements (the one best
aligned with the Schmidt basis). When the key rate
is extracted from this measurement to minimize the
cost of error correction (see Ref. [20] for more details),
the value of the X quantity is then larger than Y, as
shown in Fig. 1. But in this case, the (X,Y) values are
very close to the line X(X + Y) = 4, for which there
is no advantage. Therefore, we only expect a small
improvement in the key rate here.
Given the values shown in Fig. 1, a better bound
on Eve’s information would be obtained if the same
CHSH value was obtained with the contributions from
X and Y being inverted, i.e. with Y > X. However, this
requires Alice to define her key-generating measurement
as being the one less aligned with the Schmidt basis,
hence leading to an increase of the error correction cost.
In this case, both conditional entropies H(Â0|E) and
H(Â0|B2) are larger, and we need to check which one
increases the most in order to infer a possible gain on the
key rate. As it turns out, the tradeoff between these two
entropies increase depends on the detection efficiency.
FIG. 2. Key rate achievable with a photonic setup as a func-
tion of the symmetric detection efficiency η. The dashed
blue curve corresponds to the key rate achieved with noisi-
fication and a security based on the CHSH quantity alone; it
is nonzero for efficiencies above ∼0.828 [20]. The continuous
red curve bases its security on the values of both X and Y
(and also includes noisification). A significant increase of the
key rate is possible for efficiencies above η > 0.923. At η = 1,
the obtained key rate is 0.346 instead of 0.252.
Namely, there are two regimes, as shown in Fig. 2.
When the detection efficiency is larger than ∼ 0.923,
relabelling the measurements in order to enter the region
with Y > X (where inequalities with Ω > pi/4 signifi-
cantly improve the bound on H(Â0|E)) is advantageous,
because the increase in Bob’s uncertainty H(Â0|B2) is
smaller. The red curve in Fig. 1 shows the corresponding
trajectory in the X-Y plane. When η < 0.923, the cost
of error correction become prohibitive compared to the
potential increase in Eve’s uncertainty, and it is better
to stay in the region X > Y, as represented by the
yellow curve in Fig. 1. There, a small increase of the key
rate is still found because the correlations do not satisfy
X(X + Y) = 4 exactly. However, this condition is only
slightly violated, resulting in an increase in key rate
smaller than ∼ 10−4, which is practically negligible. The
critical detection efficiency then also remains at 82.8%,
unchanged compared to a bound based on CHSH alone.
d. Comparison of qubit vs SPDC bounds– To illus-
trate the impact of the photon statistics of SPDC sources
on DIQKD, we now consider a simpler model in which
the state shared between Alice and Bob is a two-qubit
state:
|ψ〉 = cos(θ) |00〉+ sin(θ) |11〉 . (50)
We are not aware of physical setups allowing one to
produce a state with θ = pi/4 but not allowing for a
different value of θ. Still, for the sake of the discussion,
9FIG. 3. Comparison of the critical detection efficiencies for
several setup models. Blue markers are for SPDC statistics,
yellow ones for measurement on a maximally entangled two-
qubit state, and red ones for measurement on an arbitrary
two-qubit state. (a) is with security from CHSH following
Eq. (3) and error correction based on the QBER [19], (b)
Eq. (3) with error correction based on conditional entropy
H(A|B) [35], (c) security from CHSH with noisification and
error correction based on H(A|B) following [20], (d) security
from X and Y with noisification and error correction based
on H(A|B).
we distinguish between the cases where the state can
be either constrained to be maximally entangled, i.e.
θ = pi/4, or can have an arbitrary parameter θ ∈ [0, pi/4].
In Fig. 3, we report the critical detection efficiencies
corresponding to various security analyses applied on
these implementations. Like for the SPDC model, no ad-
vantage on the critical detection efficiency is found when
using arbitrary two-qubit systems. A small advantage
is however present when restricting to measurements on
the singlet state. Still, this model is not optimal and
it remains of course better to use partially entangled
states. In fact, even partially entangled states produced
by an SPDC source perform better.
In this respect, it is worth noticing here that the per-
formance of an SPDC source is essentially comparable to
that of an arbitrary two-qubit state once noisification is
taken into consideration, i.e. the requirement on the de-
tection efficiency is very similar. In the case with no nois-
ification, the state produced by these physical sources do
not have a better tolerance to losses than measurements
on a maximally entangled state. Noisy preprocessing is
thus a key ingredient for a first proof of principle imple-
mentation with an SPDC source [20].
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we introduced a refinement of the usual
CHSH-based analysis of DIQKD experiments: Instead
of projecting the measurement statistics onto a single
line giving the CHSH score 2
√
2(X + Y), we kept the
information about the individual values of X and Y
throughout the whole security analysis. We found that
this refined analysis gives a more restrictive bound on
the information available to the eavesdropper for almost
all values X and Y in the quantum set.
When applying our results to photonic implementa-
tions of DIQKD with a SPDC source, we found that the
key rate is improved by a factor going up to 37% for unit
detection efficiency. On the other hand, we could not
find any improvement for the critical detection efficiency
as compared to the CHSH protocol with noisy processing
presented in Ref. [20]. However, we focused on a given
photonic implementation, and the question of the most
favorable optical setup combining squeezing operations,
displacement operations, linear optical elements and
photon counting techniques is still open. Advanced tech-
niques using automated design of quantum experiments
based on reinforcement learning which already proved to
be useful to optimize the CHSH score [36] are inspiring.
Applying them to the proposed protocol in order to
reduce the required detection efficiency for implementing
DIQKD appears to be promising for future work.
Finally, we would like to remark that the certified nu-
merical techniques we proposed also open up the possi-
bility of bounding Eve’s information reliably when more
correlators, or even the full measurement statistics, are
taken into account.
VI. NOTE ADDED
While writing this manuscript, we became aware of
another manuscript [24] reporting on similar results.
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Appendix A: Analytical results
1. Parametrization of two-qubit models
Following the logic of [19], we assume, without loss of
generality that after the qubit reduction, the state shared
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by Alice, Bob and Eve is of the form
|Ψ〉ABE =
4∑
i=1
√
Li
∣∣Φi〉
AB
|i〉E (A1)
where we |Φi〉 = {Φ+,Ψ−,Φ−,Ψ+}4i=1, with nonnegative
L1 ≥ L2 and L3 ≥ L4, and the measurements Ax, By
appearing in the constraint are in the x-z plane
Ax = a
T
x
(
σz
σx
)
By = b
T
y
(
σz
σx
)
. (A2)
The key generating setting is explicitly parametrized by
an angle φ
a0 =
(
Cφ
Sφ
)
. (A3)
(As mentioned in the main text we use a compact nota-
tion Cφ = cos(φ) and Sφ = sin(φ) throughout the paper.)
One notes that the application of a unitary transforma-
tion σZ on Alice’s system is equivalent to changing the
state and the measurements as
(L1, L2, L3, L4)→ (L3, L4, L1, L2)
ax → σzax
by → by.
(A4)
The two situations are completely equivalent for our pur-
pose, so our parametrization of quantum models is ac-
tually redundant. To avoid this, we can introduce an
order relation between the pairs of coefficients (L1, L2)
and (L3, L4) (permuted by a basis transformation). In
particular, we will impose
L1 − L2 ≥ L3 − L4 (A5)
below, but will also use L1+L2 ≥ L3+L4 for the certified
numerical algorithm.
We also introduce a different parametrization of the
probability simplex L with a vector T = (Tz, Tx, Tp)
given by 
Tz = (L1 − L2) + (L3 − L4)
Tx = (L1 − L2)− (L3 − L4)
Tp = L1 + L2 − L3 − L4.
(A6)
The conditions L1 ≥ L2, L3 ≥ L4 and L1−L2 ≥ L3−L4
enforce
0 ≤ Tx ≤ Tz ≤ 1
Tz + Tx − 1 ≤ Tp ≤ 1− (Tz − Tx) (A7)
2. Entropies of ρE|aˆ=±1
Having introduced a parametrization of quantum
models, we now express the quantities of interest
H(ρE), H(ρE |Aˆ0) and BΩ as functions of the distribution
L describing the state |Ψ〉ABE and the measurement set-
tings ax,by. The marginal state of Eve is straightforward
to write down:
ρE =
 L1 L2 L3
L4
 . (A8)
For the conditional states, we have
ρE|aˆ=+1 = 2 trAB
1 + Aˆ0
2
⊗ 1BE |Ψ〉〈Ψ|ABE =

L1 0 Cφ
√
L1L3q Sφ
√
L1L4q
0 L2 Sφ
√
L2L3q −Cφ
√
L2L4q
Cφ
√
L1L3q Sφ
√
L2L3q L3 0
Sφ
√
L1L4q −Cφ
√
L2L4q 0 L4
 , (A9)
where the factor of two arises because the probability to observe the outcome Aˆ0 = 1 is simply
1
2 . The conditional
state for the other outcome Aˆ0 = −1 can be easily obtained by noticing that the two outcomes are interchanged by a
mapping Aˆ0 → −Aˆ0, i.e. with the inversion of the vector
(
Cφ
Sφ
)→ −(Cφ
Sφ
)
. Consequently, we have
ρE|aˆ=−1 =
 1 1 −1
−1
 ρE|aˆ=1
 1 1 −1
−1
 . (A10)
It follows that the entropies of both conditional states are equal and
H(ρE |Aˆ0) = 1
2
H(ρE|aˆ=+1) +
1
2
H(ρE|aˆ=−1) = H(ρE|aˆ=+1). (A11)
Analogously to Eq. (A10), there are unitary transformations (with different positions of 1 and −1 on the diagonal)
that correspond to the transformations
(
Cφ
Sφ
)→ (−Cφ
Sφ
)
and
(
Cφ
Sφ
)→ ( Cφ−Sφ). This implies that H(ρE |Aˆ0) and H(Aˆ0|E)
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do not depend on these sign changes, i.e. they are only functions of C2φ and S
2
φ.
3. Optimal key generating setting a0
In this section, we give the minimal angle φ for which constraint BΩ ≥ β can be fulfilled for a given L. We first
focus on the possible values of φ. The expected Bell score is straightforward to compute:
BΩ = 1
2
tr (((CΩA0 ⊗ (B0 +B1) + SΩA1 ⊗ (B0 −B1))⊗ 1E) |Ψ〉〈Ψ|ABE)
=
1
2
CΩ a
T
0
(
Tz
Tx
)
(b0 + b1) +
1
2
SΩ a
T
1
(
Tz
Tx
)
(b0 − b1)
(A12)
From this expression we notice that any of the following transformations of the key generating setting:
a0 →
(
(−1)s1
(−1)s2
)
a0, (A13)
with s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1} can be compensated by applying the same transformation to the remaining settings a1, by to
give the same Bell score BΩ. Furthermore, we have seen that this transformation does not change Eve’s conditional
entropy H(Aˆ0|E). Therefore we can always restrict a0 to the positive quadrant of the circle
φ ∈ [0, pi
2
] (A14)
without loss of generality.
We now express the Bell score with Bob’s settings
parametrized as in Eq. (17):
BΩ =
〈
CΩCθ a0 ·
(
Z
X
)
⊗ c ·
(
Z
X
)
+SΩSθ a1 ·
(
Z
X
)
⊗ c⊥ ·
(
Z
X
)〉
.
(A15)
Computing the expected value of the operators on our
Bell diagonal state gives
BΩ = CΩCθ aT0
(
Tz
Tx
)
c+ SΩSθ a
T
1
(
Tz
Tx
)
c⊥.
(A16)
We introduce an angle γ to parametrize the vectors c and
c⊥:
c =
(
Cγ
Sγ
)
, c⊥ =
(−Sγ
Cγ
)
. (A17)
The maximization with the second setting of Alice is
straightforward, that is
max
a1
Sθa
T
1
(
Tz
Tx
)
c⊥ = ‖Sθ
(
Tz
Tx
)
c⊥‖
= |Sθ|
√
T 2z S
2
γ + T
2
xC
2
γ .
(A18)
The Bell score (optimized with respect to a1) becomes
BΩ = CΩCθ
(
Cφ
Sφ
)T(
Tz
Tx
)(
Cγ
Sγ
)
+ SΩ|Sθ|
√
T 2z S
2
γ + T
2
xC
2
γ .
Since Tz, Tx ≥ 0 and φ,Ω ∈ [0, pi2 ], we can also restrict
the angle θ and γ to the interval [0, pi2 ] without loss of
generality, and drop the absolute value: |Sθ| = Sθ. The
constraint BΩ ≥ β takes the form
CΩ
(
Cφ
Sφ
)T(
Tz
Tx
)(
Cγ
Sγ
)
≥
β − SΩSθ
√
T 2z S
2
γ + T
2
xC
2
γ
Cθ
.
(A19)
Recall that we wish to find the minimal φ for which this
inequality can be fulfilled for at least one value of the free
parameters θ and γ. We observe that if the right hand
side (RHS) can become zero or negative by some choice
of θ and γ, the constraint becomes trivial. Since Tz ≥ Tx,
this is possible for
β2 ≤ S2ΩT 2z =⇒ φ∗ = 0. (A20)
In the following we assume that this is not the case,
i.e. β2 > S2ΩT
2
z . The angle θ only appears on the right of
the inequality, so to satisfy the inequality our best choice
is to minimize the RHS with respect to θ. The expression
β − SΩSθ
√
T 2z S
2
γ + T
2
xC
2
γ
Cθ
(A21)
either has a local minimum that can be found by setting
its derivative to zero, or there is no local minimum and
the expression is minimal at the boundary θ = 0 since it
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diverges for θ → pi2 . Differentiating the expression with
respect to theta, we find that a local minumum does exist
at
Sθ =
SΩ
√
T 2z S
2
γ + T
2
xC
2
γ
β
, (A22)
(recall the assumption above). Plugging this value into
Eq. (A19) allows us to rewrite the constraint as
CΩ
(
Cφ
Sφ
)T(
Tz
Tx
)(
Cγ
Sγ
)
≥
√
β2 − S2Ω(T 2z S2γ + T 2xC2γ),
which we rewrite as(
Cφ
Sφ
)T
vγ ≥ 1, with
vγ =
CΩ√
β2 − S2Ω(T 2z S2γ + T 2xC2γ)
(
TzCγ
TxSγ
)
.
(A23)
Now it becomes simple to check if the constraint can
be satisfied at all. The vector vγ belongs to the positive
quadrant of the plane with v0 ‖
(
1
0
)
and vpi/2 ‖
(
0
1
)
, hence
the inequality a0 · vγ ≥ 1 can be satisfied if and only if
the length of the vector vγ reaches 1, i.e.
|vγ |2 =
C2Ω(T
2
z C
2
γ + T
2
xS
2
γ)
β2 − S2Ω(T 2z S2γ + T 2xC2γ)
≥ 1 for some γ.
(A24)
We rewrite this inequality as
1
2
(
T 2z + T
2
x + (T
2
z − T 2x )C2γC2Ω − 2β2
) ≥ 0. (A25)
Given that T 2z ≥ T 2x , the left hand side (LHS) is maximal
for γ = 0 if Ω ≤ pi4 and for γ = pi2 if Ω > pi4 . Hence,BΩ ≥ β can be fulfilled if and only if
for Ω ≤ pi
4
, C2ΩT
2
z + S
2
ΩT
2
x ≥ β2
for Ω >
pi
4
, S2ΩT
2
z + C
2
ΩT
2
x ≥ β2.
(A26)
Consider the first case Ω ≤ pi
4
. Setting γ = 0 one
verifies that if the constraint can be fulfilled, then it can
be fulfilled with φ = 0:(
1
0
)T
v0 =
CΩTz√
β2 − S2ΩT 2x
≥ 1
⇐⇒ C2ΩT 2z + S2ΩT 2x ≥ β2.
(A27)
Hence, in this case the minimal possible angle is φ∗ = 0
as long as the Bell score can be attained as formalized
by Eq. (A26).
The other case Ω >
pi
4
is less trivial. Assume that the
constraint can be satisfied, S2ΩT
2
z + C
2
ΩT
2
x ≥ β2. We first
check if φ = 0 is a solution((
1
0
)T
vγ
)2
=
C2ΩC
2
γT
2
z
β2 − S2Ω(T 2z S2γ + T 2xC2γ)
≥ 1
⇐⇒ C2γ(C2ΩT 2z + S2ΩT 2x − S2ΩT 2z ) + S2ΩT 2z ≥ β2
(A28)
As S2ΩT
2
z + C
2
ΩT
2
x ≥ β2 ≥ S2ΩT 2z , the LHS is maximal for
γ = 0. Therefore φ∗ = 0 iff
C2ΩT
2
z + S
2
ΩT
2
x ≥ β2. (A29)
We now assume
S2ΩT
2
z + C
2
ΩT
2
x ≥ β2 > C2ΩT 2z + S2ΩT 2x , (A30)
such that the constraint can be fulfilled but not with
φ = 0. To find the minimal φ that allows to do so we
look on the dependence of the length of the vector vγ on
γ. We compute
d
dγ
|vγ |2 = (T
2
z − T 2x )C2ΩS2γ
(β2 − (T 2z S2γ + T 2xC2γ)S2Ω)2
((T 2z +T
2
x )S
2
Ω−β2),
here (T 2z +T
2
x )S
2
Ω ≥ S2ΩT 2z +C2ΩT 2x ≥ β2. Thus the deriva-
tive is positive and the length of vγ is increasing with γ.
We can now give a simple geometrical interpretation
to our problem of finding the minimal φ: for each value
φ such that (
Cφ
Sφ
)T
vγ ≥ 1 (A31)
a line tangent to the unit circle at
(
Cφ
Sφ
)
is also crossing
the curve vγ . So for the minimal value φ∗ there is a line
tangent to both vγ and the unit circle at
(
Cφ∗
Sφ∗
)
. The
equation of the line tangent to vγ reads `(λ) = vγ +λv
′
γ .
This line is tangent to the unit circle if and only if the
equation
|vγ + λv′γ |2 = 1 (A32)
has only one solution, where the derivative is with respect
to γ. This is a quadratic equation
λ2|v′γ |2 + 2λv′γ · vγ + |vγ |2 − 1 = 0, (A33)
which has a unique solution iff its determinant is zero(
v′γ · vγ
)2
= |v′γ |2
(|vγ |2 − 1) . (A34)
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With
v′γ =
CΩ
(β2 − S2Ω(T 2xC2γ + T 2z S2γ))3/2
(
TzSγ(T
2
z S
2
Ω − β2)
−TxCγ(T 2xS2Ω − β2)
)
(A35)
lengthy but straightforward algebra gives
S2γ = −
T 2x (β
2 − T 2xS2Ω)(β2 − (T 2z + T 2x )S2Ω)
(T 2z − T 2x )
(
β4 + S2Ω(T
2
xT
2
z − 2β2(T 2x + T 2z )) + S4Ω(T 4x + T 4z )
) . (A36)
To find that the minimal angle φ∗ note that for the tangent line
(
Cφ∗
Sφ∗
) ·v′γ = 0, and therefore (−Sφ∗Cφ∗ ) = v′γ|v′γ | . Plugging
in the above equations we find
c2∗(L,Ω, β) = cos
2
(
φ∗(L,Ω, β)
)
=
(β2 − S2ΩT 2x )(C2ΩT 2x + S2ΩT 2z − β2)
C2Ω(T
2
z − T 2x )(S2ΩT 2z + S2ΩT 2x − β2)
. (A37)
4. Eve’s maximum information for Ω ≤ pi
4
We here give details on the derivation of the formula (25) in the main text which corresponds to Eve’s maximum
information in the case Ω ≤ pi4 . For these inequalities we have seen that the constraint C2Ω T 2z + SΩ T 2x ≥ β2 can be
fulfilled with c2∗(L, β) = 1. The choice of the measurement angle implies Cφ = 1 implies a simple form for the state ?
ρE|aˆ=+1 =

L1 0
√
L1L3q 0
0 L2 0 −
√
L2L4q√
L1L3q 0 L3 0
0 −√L2L4q 0 L4
 , (A38)
with a closed form expression for its eigenvalues implying
H(ρE|aˆ=1) = H
(
p =

1
2
(
L1 + L3 +
√
4L1L3q + (L1 − L3) 2
)
1
2
(
L1 + L3 −
√
4L1L3q + (L1 − L3) 2
)
1
2
(
L2 + L4 +
√
4L2L4q + (L2 − L4) 2
)
1
2
(
L2 + L4 −
√
4L2L4q + (L2 − L4) 2
)

)
. (A39)
The constraint on the generalized CHSH score leads to the following constraint on the vector L(
T 2Z
T 2X
)
·
(
C2Ω
S2Ω
)
= 2 (L3 − L4) (L1 − L2) C2Ω + (L1 − L2) 2 + (L3 − L4) 2 ≥ β2. (A40)
Our goal is thus to find the components of the vector L maximizing H(L)−H(p) and satisfying the previous constraint.
Inspired by Ref. [20], we first introduce the following parametrization
L1 = Px L3 = P (1− x) L2 = (1− P )y L4 = (1− P )(1− y). (A41)
The partial ordering of the L coefficients implies
(1− P )y ≤ Px ≤ (1− P )y + 2P − 1 (A42)
which requires P ≥ 12 . The advantage of this parametrization comes from the fact that our figure of merit can be
nicely rewritten as
H(L)−H(p) = Phq(x) + (1− P )hq(y)
hq(z) = h(z)− h(nq(z))
nq(z) =
1 +
√
1− 4 (1− q) z(1− z)
2
(A43)
where h(z) = −z log(z) − (1 − z) log(1 − z) is the binary entropy function with the logarithm in base 2, while the
constraint on the expected value of the generalized CHSH operator is given by
SΩ (2P (x+ y − 1)− 2y + 1)2 + CΩ (1− 2P )2 ≥ β2 (A44)
For a fixed P, the curve in the (x, y)-plan that corre- sponds to a constant value β satisfies P dx = (1−P ) dy.
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This remark allows one to maximize H(L)−H(p) along
this curve and find that it is optimal for Eve to set
x+y = 1, see appendix C2 in Ref. [20] for the detailed ar-
gument. The symmetry of the function hq(x) = hq(1−x)
allows us to write the problem as
max
x,P
H(L)−H(p) = hq(x)
s.t. (2P − 1)2C2Ω + (1− 2x)2S2Ω ≥ β2.
(A45)
As the goal function hq(x) does not depend on P , we can
set its value to P = 1 because this is the value maximizing
the LHS of the constraint inequality and allowing the
largest possible interval for the remaining variable x. We
thus get
max
x,P
H(L)−H(p) = hq(x)
s.t. (1− 2x)2 ≥ β
2 − C2Ω
S2Ω
.
(A46)
Finally, as hq(x) is a monotonically decreasing function of
x (see Ref. [20]), it is optimal to set x to the least possible
value compatible with the constraint. This implies
I(β; Ω, q) = hq(z)
with z =
1
2

√
β2 − C2Ω
SΩ
+ 1
 . (A47)
Let us now recall that the situation with c2∗(L, β) = 1
and C2Ω T
2
z + SΩ T
2
x ≥ β2 also occurs in the case Ω >
pi
4 . The above proof guarantees that it is optimal for
Eve to use strategies where the inequality is saturated
C2Ω T
2
z + SΩ T
2
x = β
2. Hence in the optimization problem
for Ω > pi4 we can ignore all the strategies with C
2
Ω T
2
z +
SΩ T
2
x > β
2.
5. Concavity of hq ◦ z(β)
Recall that in order to use the bound I(β; Ω, q) derived
for two-qubit strategies in the previous section as a uni-
versal bound (valid for strategies in any dimension), we
have to show that this function is concave. In this case,
for any mixture of qubit strategies (enforced by the Jor-
dan’s lemma) with an average score β¯ =
∑
i piβi, Eve’s
information satisfies
I¯(β; Ω, q) =
∑
i
piI(βi; Ω, q) ≤ I(β¯; Ω, q). (A48)
The concavity of I(β; Ω, q) = hq(z(β)) follows from the
fact that its second derivative is negative
d2
dβ2
hq
(
z(β)
)
= h′′q (z)
(
z′(β)
)2
+ h′q(z)z
′′(β) ≤ 0, (A49)
which we are going to show below. In this section we will
use the natural algorithm instead of logarithm in base
2. The function hq(z) takes a positive real factor upon
changing the base of the algorithm, so it is irrelevant for
its concavity. Note first that z(β) ∈ [ 12 , 1] and√
β2 − C2Ω = SΩ(2z − 1). (A50)
Then consider the following identities
(z′(β))2 =
β2
4S2Ω(β
2 − C2Ω)
=
S2Ω(2z − 1)2 + C2Ω
4S4Ω(2z − 1)2
z′′(β) =
−C2Ω
2SΩ(β2 − C2Ω)3/2
=
−C2Ω
2S4Ω(2z − 1)3
.
(A51)
The identity (A49) that we want to prove thus becomes
h′′q (z)(2z − 1)(S2Ω(2z − 1)2 + C2Ω)− 2h′q(z)C2Ω
4S4Ω(2z − 1)3
≤ 0.
(A52)
Multiplying by a positive fraction
4S4Ω(2z−1)3
C2Ω
it can be
straightforwardly simplified to the form
h′′q (z)(2z − 1)(T2Ω(2z − 1)2 + 1)− 2h′q(z) ≤ 0. (A53)
As h′′q (z) ≤ 0 was proven in [20, 37], we have the inequal-
ity
h′′q (z)(2z − 1)2 T2Ω ≤ 0. (A54)
We use it to relax the inequality in Eq. (A53) to
h′′q (z)(z −
1
2
)− h′q(z) ≤ 0. (A55)
At the point z = 12 the left hand side becomes zero, since
h′q(
1
2 ) = 0 and |h′′q ( 12 )| < ∞, see below. From now on,
we thus exclude the point z = 12 and consider z ∈ ( 12 , 1].
Now we can divide the whole expression by a strictly
positive factor (z − 12 )2. We obtain
1
2
h′′q (z)(z − 12 )− h′q(z)(z − 12 )′
(z − 12 )2
≤ 0, (A56)
or
1
2
(
h′q(z)
z − 12
)′
=
(
h′q(z)
2z − 1
)′
≤ 0. (A57)
In other words we want to show that the function
(∗) d
dz
(
h′q(z)
2z − 1
)
≤ 0 (A58)
on the interval z ∈ ( 12 , 1]. Let us now compute this func-
tion:
h′q(z)
2z − 1 =
h′(z)
2z − 1 − h
′(nq(z))
n′q(z)
2z − 1 . (A59)
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The last fraction can be simplified to
n′q(z)
2z − 1 =
(2z − 1)(1− q)
(2z − 1)√1− 4 (1− q) z(1− z)
=
1− q
2nq(z)− 1 .
(A60)
Therefore
h′q(z)
2z − 1 =
h′(z)
2z − 1 − (1− q)
h′(nq(z))
2nq(z)− 1
= g(z)− (1− q)g(nq(z)), (A61)
where
g(z) =
h′(z)
2z − 1 = −
log( z1−z )
2z − 1 . (A62)
To complete the proof we thus need to show that
(∗) g′(z)− (1− q)g′(nq(z))n′q(z) ≤ 0. (A63)
From Eq. (A60), we have
n′q(z) = (1− q)
2z − 1
2nq(z)− 1 , (A64)
so the inequality to be shown can be rewritten as
g′(z)
2z − 1 − (1− q)
2 g
′(nq(z))
2nq(z)− 1 ≤ 0. (A65)
For q = 0 we have (1− q) = 1 and nq(z) = z so the two
terms are equal. The identity to be shown can then be
expressed as
(∗) f(z, 0)− f(z, q) ≤ 0 with
f(z, q) = (1− q)2u(nq(z))
u(z) =
g′(z)
2z − 1 =
1
z−1 +
1
z + 2 log
(
z
1−z
)
(2z − 1)3 ,
(A66)
which holds for q = 0 trivially. To show that it holds
for all q it is sufficient to demonstrate that the function
f(z, q) is increasing with q, i.e.
(∗) d
dq
f(z, q) ≥ 0, (A67)
which we are going to show now. Using
d
dq
nq(z) =
(1− z)z√
1− 4(1− q)(1− z)z =
nq(z)(1− nq(z))
(1− q)(2nq(z)− 1)
we obtain
d
dq
f(z, q) = −2(1− q)u(nq(z))+ (1− q)2u′(nq(z)) d
dq
nq(z)
= −2(1− q)u(n) + (1− q)u′(n)n(1− n)
2n− 1
(A68)
for n > 12 , which is positive iff q = 1 or
(∗) u′(n)n(1− n)− 2u(n)(2n− 1) ≥ 0. (A69)
In the case q < 1, straightforward algebra allows to find
a simple expression of the left hand side and rewrite the
condition as
6n2 − 4n3 − 1 + 4(n4 − 2n3 + 2n2 − n) log
(
n
1−n
)
(2n− 1)4n(1− n) ≥ 0
⇐⇒
6n2 − 4n3 − 1 + 4(n4 − 2n3 + 2n2 − n) log
(
n
1− n
)
≥ 0
(A70)
Changing the variable to x + 1 = n1−n with x ≥ 0 we
express the above inequality as
x(x2 + 6x+ 6)
(x+ 2)3
− 4(x+ 1)(x
2 + 3x+ 3)
(x+ 2)4
log(x+ 1) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ log(1 + x) ≤ x(x+ 2)(x
2 + 6x+ 6)
4(x+ 1)(x2 + 3x+ 3)
.
(A71)
To prove this relation note that there is equality for x =
0, but the LHS increases slower than the RHS
log′(1 + x) ≤
(
x(x+ 2)(x2 + 6x+ 6)
4(x+ 1)(x2 + 3x+ 3)
)′
⇐⇒
1
1 + x
≤ 1
4
(
9(x+ 1)
(x(x+ 3) + 3)2
+
1
(x+ 1)2
+
3
x(x+ 3) + 3
+ 1
)
⇐⇒ x
4(x+ 2)2
4(x+ 1)2(x(x+ 3) + 3)2
≥ 0,
(A72)
which concludes the proof.
a. Properties of h′q(
1
2 ) and h
′′
q (
1
2 ) We start with the
first derivative and want to show that h′q(
1
2 ) = 1/2. We
have
h′q(z) =
(
h(z)− h(nq(z))
)′
= h′(z)− h′(nq(z))n′q(z)
(A73)
The binary entropy hits a maximum at z = 1/2 so
h′( 12 ) = 0. For the second term, we use (A64) to get
h′(nq(z))n′q(z) = −(1− q)
2z − 1
2nq(z)− 1 log
(
nq(z)
1− nq(z)
)
,
(A74)
(2z − 1) = 0 at z = 12 , while
| 1− q
2nq(z)− 1 log
(
nq(z)
1− nq(z)
)
|z=1/2|
= |
(1− q) log
(
1+
√
q
1−√q
)
√
q
|
. (A75)
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Changing the variable to x+ 1 =
1+
√
q
1−√q with x ≥ 0 yields
for the last expression
|4(x+ 1) log(x+ 1)
x(x+ 2)
| <∞. (A76)
It is obviously bounded for x >  with any , and the fact
that the limit x→ 0 exists can be seen by straightforward
application of l’Hoˆpital’s rule. Hence,
h′q(
1
2
) = 0. (A77)
We also wish to show that the second derivative h′′q (
1
2 )
is bounded. To do so we compute
h′′q (
1
2
) =
2(1− q) log
(
1+
√
q
1−√q
)
√
q
− 4. (A78)
But as we have just shown that
|
(1− q) log
(
1+
√
q
1−√q
)
√
q
| <∞, (A79)
the desired result
|h′′q (
1
2
)| <∞ (A80)
follows.
6. Maximization of the generalized CHSH score
with respect to auxiliary settings
In the goal function
H(ρE)−H(ρE |aˆ0(q)) + tBΩ(L, φ,a1, b0, b1) (A81)
that a priori appears in Eq. (38), it is only the Bell
score which depends on the auxiliaty measuremnt set-
tigns a1, b0 and b1. As t is always positive we can straigt-
forwardly maximise the score with respect to these set-
tings. We thus define
βmax(L, φ) = max
a1,b0,b1
BΩ(L, φ,a1, b0, b1), (A82)
which actually appears in Eq. (38).
Let us now compute this expression starting from
Eq. (A16), that we put in the form
BΩ =
(
Cθ
Sθ
)
·
(
CΩ a
T
0
(
TzCγ
TxSγ
)
SΩ a
T
1
(−TzSγ
TxCγ
) ) . (A83)
This form makes the maximization with respect to θ and
a1 straightforward
max
θ,a1
BΩ
= max
a1
√(
CΩ aT0
(
TzCγ
TxSγ
))2
+
(
SΩ aT1
(−TzSγ
TxCγ
))2
=
√
C2Ω (CφTzCγ + SφTxSγ)
2
+ S2Ω
(
T 2z S
2
γ + T
2
xC
2
γ
)
.
(A84)
To find the maximum with respect to γ or c =
(
Cγ
Sγ
)
it is
convenient to write the expression inside the square root
as (
max
θ,a1
BΩ
)2
=
cT
(
C2ΩC
2
φT
2
z + S
2
ΩT
2
x C
2
ΩCφSφTzTx
C2ΩCφSφTzTx C
2
ΩS
2
φT
2
x + S
2
ΩT
2
z
)
c.
(A85)
It is now obvious that the value is maximal if c is aligned
with the eigenvector of the matrix which corresponds to
the maximal eigenvalue. Therefore
βmax(L, φ) = max
θ,γ,a1
BΩ(L, φ,a1, b0, b1),
=
√
Eig+
(
C2ΩC
2
φT
2
Z + S
2
ΩT
2
x C
2
ΩCφSφTzTx
C2ΩCφSφTzTx C
2
ΩS
2
φT
2
x + S
2
ΩT
2
z
)
=
1√
2
(
C2Ω(C
2
φT
2
z + S
2
φT
2
x ) + S
2
Ω(T
2
z + T
2
x )+√
(C2Ω(C
2
φT
2
z − S2φT 2x )− S2Ω(T 2z − T 2x ))2 + 4(C2ΩCφSφTzTx)2
)1/2
.
(A86)
Appendix B: Numerical tool
1. Lipshitz continuity of von Neumann entropy
Consider two states ρ and σ on an n-dimensional
Hilbert space, that are close in fidelity:
F (ρ, σ) = tr|√ρ√σ| = f. (B1)
Given the monotonicity of arccos in the range [0, 1], this
condition can be equivalently written in terms of the an-
gle A(ρ, σ) = arccos(F (ρ, σ))
A(ρ, σ) = a = arccos(f). (B2)
The angle is a metric on the space of density opera-
tors [26], in particular it satisfies the triangle inequality.
Next, note that the angle between two states is lower
bounded by the angle between the ordered vectors made
of their ordered eigenvalues
a = A(ρ, σ) ≥ A(p,q) = arccos (√p · √q) , (B3)
with p = Eig↓(ρ), q = Eig↓(σ) such that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . .
This inequality follows from
F (ρ, σ) = tr|√ρ√σ| = max
U
tr
√
ρ (
√
σU)
≤ √p · √q,
(B4)
where in second line we used the so-called von Neumann
trace inequality [38]. This bound is useful because the
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entropies of the states match the entropies of the proba-
bility distributions
H(ρ) = H(p) H(σ) = H(q). (B5)
Let us now bound their difference
∆H = |H(ρ)−H(σ)| = |H(p)−H(q)|. (B6)
To do so, note that for any two unit vectors
√
p and
√
q
on the n-sphere there exist a path γ connecting the two
and such that the integral along the path satisfies∫ √q
√
p
dA = A(p,q) ≤ a. (B7)
Let us bound the variation of the entropy along the
path. To this end, we associate a probability distribution
r to each vector v on the path γ, with ri = (v
(i))2 (note
that the vectors along the curve remain in the positive
part of the n-sphere v(i) ≥ 0). A step dA from v along
the path corresponds to some deformation of the vector
given by
vdA → v + v⊥dA, (B8)
with v · v⊥ = 0. From
H(r) = −
∑
i
(v(i))2 log((v(i))2) (B9)
we compute the entropy variation for an infinitesimal in-
crement of the angle
|dH
dA
| = 2|
∑
i
v(i)v
(i)
⊥ (
1
loge(2)
+ log((v(i))2))|
= 2|
∑
i
v
(i)
⊥ v
(i) log((v(i))2)|
= 2 |v⊥ ·w| ≤ 2||w||
(B10)
where we defined a vector w as wi = v
(i) log((v(i))2) =√
ri log(ri). Hence we obtain
|dH
dA
| ≤ 2
√∑
i
ri log
2(ri), (B11)
and it remains to bound the expression on the RHS. To
do so, we will construct a concave upper bound on the
function
c(r) = r log2(r) (B12)
defined on [0, 1]. By computing the second derivative
c′′(r) = 2
1 + loge(r)
r loge(2)
2
(B13)
we see that the function is concave c′′ ≤ 0 on the interval
r ∈ [0, 1e ], and convex on the complement. To get a
concave upper-bound we look for a line passing by r = 0
and c(1) = 0 and tangent to c(r). In the (r, c)-plane the
equation of a line tangent to c(r) at r is given by
`r(λ) =
(
r
c(r)
)
+
(
1
c′(r)
)
λ. (B14)
It passes through the point `r(λ) = (1, 0) iff
c(r) + c′(r)(r − 1) = 0
log(r)(−2r + log(r) + 2) = 0
with solutions{
r1 = − 12W0(− 2e2 ) ≈ 0.203
r2 = 1
(B15)
where W0 is the principal branch of the Lambert W -
function. The second solution r2 = 1 is irrelevant. From
the first solution we can construct a concave upper bound
c(r) ≤ cˆ(r) =
{
c(r) r ≤ r1
c(r1)
1−r
1−r1 r > r1.
(B16)
Note that r1 <
1
e .
Finally with the concave bound cˆ it is easy to obtain∑
i
ri log
2(ri) =
∑
i
c(ri)
≤
∑
i
cˆ(ri) = n
∑
i
1
n
cˆ(ri)
≤ n cˆ
(∑
i
ri
n
)
= n cˆ
(
1
n
)
.
(B17)
So for entropy susceptibility we get
|dH
dA
| ≤ 2
√
n cˆ(
1
n
) (B18)
For n ≤ 4 one has 1n > r1, while for n ≥ 5 the contrary
is true, 1n < r1. Therefore we can have a more explicit
expression
|dH
dA
| ≤
{
4
√
r1(1− r1)
√
n− 1 n ≤ 4
2 log(n) n ≥ 5 , (B19)
where we used the equation − log(r1) = 2(1 − r1) to
compute c(r1). In particular we get for n = 4
cˆ
(
1
4
)
= c(r1)
1− 1/4
1− r1 < 1.011. (B20)
and deduce
|dH
dA
| ≤ 2
√
4 cˆ
(
1
4
)
< 4.023. (B21)
18
To bound the global entropy difference, we simply inte-
grate along the curve γ to get
∆H ≤
∫ √q
√
p
|dH| =
∫ √q
√
p
|dH
dA
| dA < 4.023A(ρ, σ).
(B22)
As a side remark, we note that for n ≥ 5, we get 1n < r1
and the bound becomes simpler
cˆ
(
1
n
)
=
log2(n)
n
, (B23)
and
|dH
dA
| ≤ 2 log(n). (B24)
2. Continuity of the goal function
a. The entropy term – To apply the continu-
ity bound previously described to our situation, let
ρ, ρ′ be the states on Aˆ0E produced by measure-
ments along angles φ, φ′ on the states |Ψ〉ABE with
the weight L,L′ respectively. Our aim is to bound∣∣∣H(Aˆ0|E)ρ −H(Aˆ0|E)ρ′ ∣∣∣ . We use∣∣∣H(Aˆ0|E)ρ −H(Aˆ0|E)ρ′ ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(ρE)−H(E|Aˆ0)ρ −H(ρ′E) +H(E|Aˆ0)ρ′ ∣∣∣
≤ |H(ρE)−H(ρ′E)|+
∣∣∣H(E|Aˆ0)ρ −H(E|Aˆ0)ρ′ ∣∣∣
(B25)
and bound the two last terms independently. For the
first term involving H(ρE)ρ, things are straightforward.
The states of Eve ρE = diag(L) are 4-dimensional and
independent of φ, so
|H(ρE)L +H(ρE)L′ | ≤ 4.023 arccos(
√
L ·
√
L′). (B26)
For the other term, we note∣∣∣H(E|Aˆ0)ρ −H(E|Aˆ0)ρ′ ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(Aˆ0E)ρ −H(Aˆ0E)ρ′ ∣∣∣
= |H(ρ)−H(ρ′)|
(B27)
as H(Aˆ0) = 1. Since Aˆ0E is 8-dimensional we get∣∣∣H(E|Aˆ0)ρ −H(E|Aˆ0)ρ′ ∣∣∣
≤ 2 log(8)A(ρ, ρ′) = 6A(ρ, ρ′).
(B28)
Given that ρ = ρ(L, φ) and ρ′ = ρ(L′, φ′), we can use the
triangle inequality to write
A(ρ, ρ′) ≤ A(ρ(L, φ), ρ(L′, φ)) +A(ρ(L′, φ), ρ(L′, φ′)).
(B29)
For A(ρ(L, φ), ρ(L′, φ)) we note that both states result
from the action of the same CPTP map on two ini-
tial state |Ψ(L)〉ABE and |Ψ(L′)〉ABE . By the data-
processing inequality (inherited by the angle from the
fidelity F ) we have
A(ρ(L, φ), ρ(L′, φ)) ≤ A(|Ψ(L)〉ABE , |Ψ(L′)〉ABE)
= A(L,L′)
= arccos(
√
L ·
√
L′).
(B30)
To bound the other term A(ρ(L′, φ), ρ(L′, φ′)) we note
that if we apply a channel that performs a Z mea-
surement followed by noisy preprocessing to the state(
eiφYA/2 ⊗ 1BE
) |Ψ〉ABE , this produces exactly the state
ρ on Aˆ0E; analogously, applying the same channel to
the state
(
eiφ
′YA/2 ⊗ 1BE
)
|Ψ〉ABE produces the state ρ′.
Therefore the data-processing inequality implies F (ρ, ρ′)
is lower-bounded by
F
((
eiφYA/2 ⊗ 1BE
)
|Ψ〉 ,
(
eiφ
′YA/2 ⊗ 1BE
)
|Ψ〉
)
=
∣∣∣〈Ψ|(ei(φ′−φ)YA/2 ⊗ 1BE) |Ψ〉∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣cos φ′ − φ2 + i sin φ′ − φ2 〈Ψ| (YA ⊗ 1BE) |Ψ〉
∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣cos φ′ − φ2
∣∣∣∣ , since 〈Ψ| (YA ⊗ 1BE) |Ψ〉 ∈ R.
(B31)
Putting these together, we conclude that (for |φ′−φ| < pi)
A(ρ(L′, φ), ρ(L′, φ′)) ≤ |φ
′ − φ|
2
. (B32)
Combining everything together, we get∣∣∣H(Aˆ0|E)ρ −H(Aˆ0|E)ρ′ ∣∣∣
≤ 10.023 arccos(
√
L ·
√
L′) + 3 |φ− φ′|
(B33)
b. The Bell score – Next we wish to bound the
increment |dβmax(L,a0,Ω)| for infinitesimal changes of
the parameters (dL, dφ). It is actually straightforward
to bound the gradient of the Bell score before the maxi-
mization with respect to a0,b0,b1, so we just need to be
careful to apply this bound on βmax.
First, note that BΩ(L, φ,a1,b0,b1) is a positive
smooth infinitely differential function of all its param-
eters. For a fixed Ω, let us group these parameters in
two vectors x = (a1,b0,b1) and y = (Tz, Tx,a0). We
then formally define
f(x,y) = BΩ(L, φ,a1,b0,b1)
g(y) = max
x
f(x,y) = βmax(L,a0,Ω).
(B34)
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We are interested in bounding |dg(y)| as a function of
dy. Consider two values of the parameter, y1 and y2,
and define
x¯1 = argmaxxf(x,y1)
x¯2 = argmaxxf(x,y2),
(B35)
such that g(y1) = f(x¯1,y1) and g(y2) = f(x¯2,y2).
Without loss of generality we assume g(y1) ≥ g(y2) and
consider the difference
|g(y1)− g(y2)| = |f(x¯1,y1)− f(x¯2,y2)|
≤ |f(x¯1,y1)− f(x¯1,y2)|
≤ max
x
|f(x,y1)− f(x,y2)|
(B36)
Taking the limit y2 → y1 we get
|dg(y)| ≤ max
x
|∇yf(x,y) · dy|. (B37)
Using the expression (A16) for BΩ(L, φ,a1,b0,b1) we
then get
|dβmax(L, φ)| ≤
 11
CΩ
 ·
 |dTz||dTx|
|dφ|
 . (B38)
3. Gradient of the goal function
We will now combine all the elements to upper bound
the gradient of the goal function
G(L, φ; Ω, q) = H(ρE)−H(E|aˆ0(q)) + tβmax(L, φ).
(B39)
We parametrize the vector L with the help of the angles
as in Eq. (44), such that the “model” is described by four
angles
(L, φ) ' ω = (α, µ, ξ, φ). (B40)
We will bound the gradient of the goal function with
respect to this parametrization.
We start with the gradient of the angle. It satisfies
dA = |A(L(ω),L(ω + ndω))|
|∇A(ω)| dω|, (B41)
with a unit vector n = (nα, nµ, nξ, 0). For the fidelity
one finds
F (L(ω),L(ω + ndω)) =
√
L(ω) ·
√
L(ω + dωi)
≥ 1− 3
4
dω2 +O(dω3)
(B42)
for dωi = dα, dµ or dξ, one easily finds
|∇A(ω)| ≤
√
3
2
. (B43)
We thus get from Eq. (B33)
|d(H(ρE)−H(E|aˆ0(q)))|
≤ 10.023
√
3
2
√
dα2 + dµ2 + dξ2 + 3dφ
(B44)
and
|∇(H(ρE)−H(E|aˆ0(q))|
≤
√
10.0232
3
2
+ 9 < 12.7
(B45)
For the gradient of the Bell score contribution
|∇βmax(L, φ)| we note that
|dTz|, |dTx| ≤ 2
(
|dα|+ |dµ|+ |dξ|
)
, (B46)
which implies form (B38) that
|∇βmax(L, φ)| ≤ t
√
3× 42 + C2Ω ≤ 7t (B47)
Finally, for the goal function
|∇G| ≤ 12.7 + 7 t . (B48)
4. Lipschitz function certified maximization on a
compact space
a. General approach – In this section section we ex-
plain how we obtain a certified maximum of a Lipschitz
function f : Rn → R with a Lipschitz constant Λ, i.e. a
bounded gradient |∇f | ≤ Λ, on a closed domain
D = {x =
x1...
xn
 ∈ Rn | xi ∈ [τi, µi], ∀ i}. (B49)
We start by meshing D into an hypercube grid graph
G(s) with element of size s. If possible, we take s so that
s evenly divides µi − τi for all i. We label the center of
each hypercube ~c so that each first neighbor in a given
direction is separated by s, e.g. for ~c and its neighbor ~c′
in the direction +~e1
~c′ =

c′1
c′2
...
c′n
 = ~c+ s.~e1 =

c1 + s
c′2
...
c′n
 . (B50)
A hypercube of center ~c, h(~c), element of G, is thus de-
fined as
h(~c) = {x ∈ Rn|ci− s
2
≤ xi ≤ ci+ s
2
, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. (B51)
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Given the Lipschitz constant Λ, the function f in a
given hypercube h(~c) is upper bounded by
f(x) ≤ f(~c) +
√
nΛ
2
s, ∀x ∈ h(~c). (B52)
Trivially, an upper bound on the maximum of f over D
is given by,
max
x∈D
f(x) ≤ max
~c∈G(s)
f(~c) +
√
nΛ
2
s. (B53)
The maximum of f over D can thus be obtained by taking
the smallest possible step, i.e.
max
x∈D
f(x) = lim
s→0
(
max
~c∈G(s)
(
f(~c) +
√
nΛ
2
s
))
. (B54)
b. Numerical realisation – While Eq. (B54) gives
the optimal maximum on f , it is however impractica-
ble using numerical resources, due to the obvious need
of discretization. A first naive approach is to relax the
problem by setting a lower bound on s. This is, with the
lower bound s ≥ ε,
max
x∈D
f(x) ≤ lim
s→ε
(
max
~c∈G(s)
(
f(~c) +
√
nΛ
2
s
))
. (B55)
Resource wise, this method is cumbersome. Indeed,
setting ε to a small value compared to the domain space,
i.e. ε  mini(τi − µi), will result in a high number of
hypercubes to explore. Furthermore, for a given step s,
the number of hypercubes scales exponentially with the
dimension n.
c. Speed-up using a guess on the maximum – Pro-
viding a guess on the maximum of f may significantly
speed up the previous method. Such a maximum can be
found using an optimization algorithm without guaran-
tees of optimality (BFGS, CMA, and others...). Denote
such a maximum as ν.
We start by setting a not-too-small step, s0, so that the
number of hypercubes composing the grid graph, G0(s0),
is reasonnable. For each hypercube h0(~c) we start by
computing the potential maximum,
ξ0(~c) = f(~c) +
√
nΛ
2
s0. (B56)
We then compare this value to ν′. In the case where
ν′ > ξ0(~c), we pass to the next hypercube since the
guessed maximum is higher than the potential maxi-
mum value of f in h0(~c). Otherwise, we mesh h0(~c)
into a new hypercube grid graph G1(s1) of element of
size s1 = s0/2. For all of the new generated hyper-
cubes, h1(~c) ∈ G1(s1), we compute the potential max-
imum ξ1(~c) using Eq. (B57). This method is applied
recursively until either all new hypercubes of graph Gkm
satisfy ν′ > hm(~c), or we reach the minimum step sm ≤ ε.
An upper bound of f is thus given by the maximum ξm(~c)
max(ξm(~c)) = f(~c) +
√
nΛ
2
sm (B57)
where sm = s0/2
m.
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